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When we describe the Hungárián traditions of legal thinking, we 
generally emphasize two remarks.1 Firstly, as a characteristic
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1 See from the literature on the subject of history of Hungárián jurisprudence: 
Somló, B., ‘Die neuere ungarische Rechtsphilosophie', in Archív für Rechts- 
und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 1, 1907-08, 315-323; Finkey, E, A tételes 
jog alapelvei és vezéreszméi [Principles and ideas of positive law], 
Budapest, 1908; Horváth, B., ‘Die ungarishe Rechtsphilosophie', in Archív 
für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 24,1930,37-85; Moór, Gy., ‘Was ist 
Rechtsphilosophie?', in Archív für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 36 (1943) 
3-49; Szabó, Imre, A burzsoá állam- és jogbölcselet Magyarországon [The 
bourgeois philosophy of State and law in Hungary], Budapest, 1955; Hanák, 
T, Az elfelejtett reneszánsz. A magyar filozófiai gondolkodás századunk 
első' felében [The forgottén renaissance. Hungárián philosophical thinking 
in the first halt of our century], Bern, 1981; Szilágy, P, ‘Fejezetek az ELTE 
Állam- és Jogelméleti Tanszékének történetéből' [Chapters from history of 
ELTE's department of theory of law], in Acta Facultatis Politico-luridicae 
Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestiensis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, 
Tomus XXVI, Budapest, 1984, 105-153; Samu, M. -  Szilágyi, R, ‘Az állam- 
és jogelmélet oktatásának története egyetemünkön' [Teaching history of 
theory of State and law in our university], in Horváth, P (ed.), Az Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar szerepe a magyar jogtudomány fejlődésében, Budapest, 
1985, 313-392; Loss, S .- Szabadfalvi, J. -  Szabó, M. -  H. Szilágyi, I. -  
Ződi, ZS., Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetéből 
[Portrays from the history of legal philosophy in Hungary], Miskolc, 1995; 
Perecz, L., ‘A belátásos elmélettől a mezőelméletig. A magyar jogfilozófia fél 
évszázada: Pikler, Somló, Moór, Horváth' [From the theory of discretionto the 
theory of law tieid. Halt century of hungarian legal philosophy: Pikler, Somló, 
Moór, Horváth] in Századvég, 1998,10, 73-94; Szabadfalvi, J., Jogbölcseleti 
hagyományok [Traditions of legal philosophy], Debrecen, 1999; Szabadfalvi, 
J., ‘Transition and Tradition. Can Hungarian traditions of legal philosophy 
contribute to legal transition?', in Rechtstheorie, 1999, Beiheft 20, 1-19.; 
Szilágyi, P, ‘Jogbölcselet' [Legal philosophy], in Magyarország а XX. 
században. V. köt., ed. István Kollega Tarsoly, Szekszárd, 2000, 39-47.; 
Szilágy, p., ‘Magyar jogbölcselet' [Hungarian legal philosophy], in Gergyely 
— Izsák (ed.), A magyar államiság ezer éve, Budapest, 2001, 257-270; 
Szabadfalvi, J., A cselekvőségi elmélettől az újrealizmusig [From the theory 
of activityto neo-realistic], Budapest, 2004.
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feature deriving from the geographical conditions and historical-cultural ties of 
Hungary, the adaptation and interpretation of the achievement of Austrian and Germán 
jurisprudence are to be mentioned. Secondly, the dual natúré of the legal thinking 
of this region of Europe is stressed, which comprises a tendency towards legal 
conservatism and an uptodate interpretation of the most current legal philosophical 
trends. The most outstanding Hungárián lawyers have been characterized by the 
latter specific feature.
The mid-1980s signalled the revival of Hungárián legal traditions. By this time the 
Soviet type Marxism has lost ground in legal literature. Further confirmation of the 
previously unquestionable paradigms have nőt pút researchers’ existence intő risk 
any longer. Fór jurists concerned with legal theory, it was only a choice of values to 
decide which paradigm would be fundamental fór them. One of the forms of finding 
new ways was provided by studies in Hungárián traditions of legal thinking before the 
year of change, which were carried out by the concerned researchers still alive and 
the younger generations who view this kind of tradition as a neglected value and take 
responsibility fór the rehabilitation of their predeccessors’ work.
Three great periods-natural law, legal positivism and Neo-Kantianism-are to be 
distinguished in the history of legal philosophy in Hungary up to the mid-twentieth 
century, mostly following the traditions of legal thinking in Europe. The attitűdé of 
legal positivism came intő full power in the Hungárián literature of jurisprudence with 
the work of Ágost Pulszky (1846-1901) in the last decades of the 19th century.2 In his 
early works Pulszky was mainly concerned with the theories of More, Bacon, Hobbes 
and Locke, the classical representatives of English social philosophy. Later in his 
career Pulszky focused on the ethnological attitűdé represented by Lubbock, Waitz, 
McLennan, Tylor, Morgan and Maine. In 1875 Pulszky completed the translation 
of Henry Maine’s Ancient Law. He alsó attached—similarly to his contemporary, 
Friedrick Pollock3—over a hundred-page notes of their own scientific value to Maine’s 
work.4 Afterwards he wrote a critical review of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy, who 
was considered as innovator of the contemporary social scientific thinking. His major 
work titled The Theory of Civil Law and Society was published in Hungárián in 
1885, and in English in 1888.5 Inspite of a favourable reaction to his work, he was nőt 
able to achieve his main goal, i.e. to enter and be accepted in the English scientific 
public life. However, Pulszky’s work, according to Hungárián legal philosophy, is still
2 Pulszky's main works of jurisprudence: A római jog, s az újabbkori jogfejló'dés [Román law and 
moder legal development], Pest, 1869; ‘Az angol jogbölcselet történetéhez' [On history of english 
legal philosophy], in Budapesti Szemle, 1875, 126-148; A jog és állambölcsészet alaptanai [The 
fundamental doctrine of philosophy of law and State], Budapest, 1885; A jog és állambölcsészet 
feladatai [The tasks of philosophy of law and State], Budapest, 1888.
3 Pollock, F., Introduction and Notes to Sir Henry Maine’s Ancient Law, London, 1908.
4 Maine, H., A jog őskora, összeköttetése a társadalom alakulásának történetével, s viszonya 
az újkori eszmékhez [Ancient law, its connections with the early history of society and its relation 
to modern ideas], (A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia megbízásából fordította, bevezette és 
jegyzetekkel kísérte Pulszky Ágost [Ágost Pulszky translated, wrote introduction and notes on 
Hungárián Academy of Sciences's authority]), Budapest, 1875.
5 Pulszky, Á., The Theory of Civil Law and Society, London, 1888.
69
Kontroll
fundamental, since the publication of this book Iáid the cornerstone of legal positivism 
in Hungary. In his work Pulszky considered Maine’s comparative-historical attitűdé 
and his theoretical theses were based on Spencer’s ideas.
Pulszky’s achievement is considered a milestone in Hungárián scientific life, since 
his major work established ground tor legal positivism in Hungary. In his positivist view 
he accepted ‘life interest’, determining the idea of evolution, as a driving force as well 
as ‘theory of activity’ reflecting the classical liberal attitűdé to law, which claims that 
the greatest individual freedom, ‘possibility fór acting’ is to be ensured by the State 
and law. Pulszky in due time realised the importance of social, economic and political 
changes at the end of the 19th century, and alsó their role in the scope of the activity 
of State. In his view, the increasing role of State was mostly apparent in the changes of 
economic conditions, in social policy and health service. Clearly perceiving tendencies 
in the development of contemporary capitalism, he outlined the idea of early social 
State beyond the classical liberal theoretical trend. He alsó paid attention to the conflict 
of nationalities beyond the boundaries of contemporary State. His work has influenced 
several branches of social Science, in this way Pulszky’s oeuvre is recognised nőt only 
by philosophy of law bút by theory of State, politics and sociology as well. From the 
end of 1880s his active political role turnéd him away from Science therefore his life- 
work is considered incomplete. Outstanding representatives of Hungárián progress 
after the turn of the century were among his students, fór example Gyula Pikler and 
Bódog Somló, who later accomplished significant works of legal philosophy and Oszkár 
Jászi—politician and scientist—who, as bourgeois radicalists, were fighting fór a new, 
modern, 20th-century Hungary devoid of any feudal constraints. They believed that a 
wide scope of social, political and legal modernisation can base the establishment of a 
Western-European model of evolution.
The positivist doctrine reached the peak of its history in Hungary with the work of 
Gyula Pikler (1864-1937) at the turn of the century.6 In his early works Pikler devoted 
attention to the inner contradictions of Spencer’s theory against the intervention of 
State. Pikler did nőt consider Spencer’s classical liberal attitűdé, which was based 
on biological conceptions as acceptable, and he emphasized the need fór increased 
State intervention fór the sake of society. Pikler’s later works are all characterized by a 
discussion with Spencer whose theories he, on one hand, analyses fór the support of 
his own theories, bút on the other hand, he criticises and evaluates them. Spencer’s 
influence is revealed in his theory of the evolution of law, or in his theory of ‘discretion’. 
He believes that people act nőt by instincts bút by purposeful discretion, and according 
to this, people realise and develop norms and institutions satisfying their needs more 
and more perfectly. In this way people establish society, institutions and law which are 
considered rational and purposeful by them. The first ones, who recognise purposeful 
discretion, are the most outstanding members of a society, the so called educated 
classes. From the 191 Os Pikler was mainly concerned with biological and psychological 
reasons behind the phenomena of society. Consequently, he became estranged
6 Pikler's main works of jurisprudence: Bevezető a jogbölcseletbe [Introduction to philosophy of 
law], Budapest, 1892; Az emberi egyesületek és különösen az állam keletkezése és fejlődése 
[The origin and development of State in particular], Budapest, 1897; A jog keletkezéséről és 
fejlődéséről [About the origin and development of law], Budapest, 1897.
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from questions of law and legal philosophy, and while changing his field of interest in 
Science, he carried out experiments in psychophysics and sense physiology.
At the turn of the 20th-century Bódog Somló7 (1871-1920) is the most reputable 
representative of Hungárián legal philosophy whose oeuvre greatly contributed to the 
development of the Neo-Kantian legal philosophy, the dominant trend prevailing in 
Central Europe et the time, a development that eventually resulted in modernisting 
the legal scholarship and theoretical thought in law in Hungary. Somló is a classic 
authority of social theorising in Hungary. His professional activity, relatively limited in 
time, spanning about a quarter of a century, can be divided intő two phases.
The first period of activity is characterised by the unconditioned acceptance and re- 
assertion of Spencer’s doctrines, concomitant with personal adherence to his one-time 
professor Gyula Pikler’s theoretical approach based on natural Science and psychology 
within the framework of a slightly materiálist version of the philosophy of history. In 
co-operation and co-authoring with Pikler,8 Somló focused his attention mainly on 
sociological problems taken from a naturalistic perspective. During this period Somló 
became-together with Ágost Pulszky and Gyula Pikler-the third outstanding figure 
determining the future of sociological positivist philosophy of law in Hungary.
The second phase of Somló’s scholarly career is defined by his Neo-Kantian 
turn, heralding maybe the most prosperous period that has ever existed in Hungárián 
legal philosophy which-reprezented mostly by his successor, Gyula Moór and, later, 
the renown legal sociologist Barna Horváth-lasted until World War Two, when the 
Soviet military occupation replaced local traditions with ‘Soviet-type’ Marxist theory 
as an all-substitutive panacea. Despite that fór early Somló legal philosophy and legal 
sociology were equal instanding, his Neo-Kantian conceptualisation led to revision 
and separation of these inter-connnected areas of legal inquiry. The outcome of this 
period founded and substantianed Somló’s scholarly reputation in legal philosophy in 
Hungary and especially in German-speaking territories. Nowadays he is duly regarded 
as a classic authority of Neo-Kantian philosophising on law in Central Europe, among 
thinkers like Rudolf Stammler, Gustav Radbruch, Hans Kelsen and Alfréd Verdross.
In his writings published around the turn of the century, he criticised the scholarly 
ideals established by his contemporaries, from the perspective of natural-science- 
inspired positivism and evolutionism. His positivist theoretical outlook was all the 
way through complemented by scholarly interest and personal involvement in public 
affairs. One of his major works characteristic of this period is the book-size treatise
7 Somló's main works of jurisprudence: Állami beavatkozás és individualizmus [State 
intervention and individualism] Budapest, 1900; Jogbölcseleti előadások [Lectures in legal 
philosophy] Kolozsvár, 1906; ‘Masstábe zűr Bewertung des Rechts', in Archív für Rechts- und 
Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 3 (1909-10) 508-522; ‘A jog értékmérői' [Value standards of law], in 
Huszadik Század, 11 (1910) 1-14; ‘Das Wertproblem', in Zeitschrift für die Philosophie und 
philosophische Kritik, (1912) 66-95; A szokásjog' [Customary law], in Farkas Lajos emlékkönyv, 
Kolozsvár, 1914, 339-369; A helyes jog elméletéről [On the theory of right-law theory] Kolozsvár 
1914; Juristische Grundlehre, Leipzig, 1917. [2. ed: 1927, and reprinted: 1973]; Jogbölcsészet 
[Legal philosophy] Budapest, 1920.




on Állami beavatkozás és individualizmus [State intervention and individualism] 
published in 1900. The greater role the State was to play and the formation of monopol 
capitalism both demanded reformulation and adaptation of the respective roles and 
institutions of law, State and politics.
From the early 1930s, in the prevailing Neo-Kantian philosophy Barna FIorváth9 
(1896-1973) created a new colour in the Flungarian traditions of legal philosophy. In 
his view of legal theory, which he preferred calling legal sociology or even ‘pure legal 
sociology’ according to Flans Kelsen’s terminology, his originality was mainly revealed 
in his so called synoptic attitűdé and the functionally related processional legal view. 
He has created something new by conforming two paradigms that were considered 
antagonistic in contemporary legal philosophy. A parrallel existence of Neo-Kantian 
(Lask, Rickert, Verdross, Kelsen, etc.) and pragmatic-empirical attitudes (Pound, 
American realism, psychologism, etc.) and their relation to each other was regarded 
as a breakthorough nőt only in Flungarian bút alsó in European legal thinking. The 
consideration of these two influential paradigms is nőt by chance. While between the 
two World Wars Neo-Kantian paradigm is to be considered evident in Middle Europe, 
pragmatism appeared as a new idea mainly in the Flungarian public view of legal 
philosophy. Florváth’s susceptibility to empirism can be attributed to two reasons. On 
one hand, he as practising lawyer realised contradictions in norms and reality, which 
was neglected by Neo-Kantian philosophy. On the other hand, during his journey to 
England in the laté 1920s, Anglo-Saxon legal culture made a great impact on him. 
His connection with Leonard Flobhouse, English sociologist, and Moris Ginsberg, 
his student, influenced the elaboration of his procedúrái legal attitűdé since FIorváth 
adapted from their views the division of four types of social evolution. After coming 
home from England, FIorváth reported in a number of papers on the achievements 
of both American and English jurisprudence. The experiences and impressions he 
gained in England ürgéd him to complete the history of English legal philosophy.
The synoptic method elaborated by FIorváth is an original interpretation of one of 
the fundamental questions of Neo-Kantian legal philosophy, namely the connection 
between value and reality. The most significant representatives of ‘contemporary’ 
Flungarian philosophy of law, including Moór, Somló and FIorváth, all concerned 
themselves with finding a solution to this problem. Florváth’s starting point was the 
essence of legal activity, and considered law as a pattern of thoughts in a judge’s
9 Horváth's main works of jurisprudence: ‘ Die Idee dér Gerechtigkeit', in Zeitschrift für öffentliches 
Recht, 7, 1928, 508-544; Természetjog és pozitivizmus' [Natural law and legal positivism], 
in Társadalomtudomány, 8, 1928, 212-247; ‘Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit', in Internationale 
Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts, 4, 1929, 1-54; ‘Die Gerechtigkeitslehre dér Vorsokratiker', 
in Studi Filosofico-Giuridici dedicati a Giorgo Del Vecchio, Modena, 1930, 336-372; Die 
Gerechtigkeitslehre des Aristoteles, Szeged, 1931; ‘Hegel und das Recht', in Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, 12, 1932, 52-89; Bevezetés a jogtudományba [Introduction to jurisprudence], 
Szeged, 1932; Rechtssoziologie. Probleme des Geselschaftslehre und dér Geschichtslehre des 
Recht, Berlin-Grunewald, 1934; ‘Sociologie juridique et Théorie Processuelle du droit', in Archives 
de Philosophie du droit etde Sociologie Juridique, 5,1935,181-242; A jogelmélet vázlata [Sketch 
of legal theory], Szeged, 1937; ‘DerSinn dér Utopie', in Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 20, 1940, 
198-230; ‘Prolegomena zűr Soziologie', in Archív für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 37,1943, 50- 
67; Angol jogelmélet [English legal theory], Budapest, 1943.
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mind, which is nothing else in this way bút a ‘reflexive theoretical product’. The 
procedure by a lawyer becomes synoptic through his applying a legal case to a legal 
norm, and at the same time, vica versa, relating a legal norm to a legal case. The 
lawyer, therefore, relates normative matters of fact to reál matters of fact. In order to 
do this job, the lawyer needs a knowledge of facts selected according to legal rules, 
and alsó a knowledge of laws selected according to matters of fact. While a practising 
lawyer focuses his attention mainly on a legal case, a theoretical lawyer concentrates 
on statutes of law, bút both consider the legal case and the law at the same time.
According to Horváth’s processional legal attitűdé, closely related to his synoptic 
method, law cannot simply be regarded as norm bút as an abstract behaviourial 
pattern and relating actual behaviour, or in other words, a connection between norm 
and behaviour, which is the procedure itself. Procedure is the ‘genus proximum’ of 
law. That is to say, a continuous relation (of synoptic structure) of a legal case to the 
legal norm will create a procedúrái process. In Horváth’s opinion, law as the most 
developed social procedure establishes the most advanced stage of procedures by 
establishing the most developed procedúrái institution.
Horváth’s role lies in the fact that traditional German-Austrian ties of the 20th 
century Neo-Kantian Hungárián legal philosophical thoughts were ‘tailored’ by 
him through transferring Anglo-Saxon theories of jurisprudence and created new 
perspectives fór further development in Hungárián legal theory. Regretfully, the 
Second World War and the following political changes forced him to emigrate in 1949 
and there he did nőt have the opportunity to continue developing his theory.10 1
József Szabó11 (1909-1992) was a prominent representative of the gitted and 
promising generation, who achieved brilliant careers during the Second World War, 
and who were involved in the intellectual and scientific renewal of the country after 
the war. After graduation he became acquainted with Barna Horváth, founder of 
school and an exceptional personality of Hungárián legal philosophy. Horváth’s 
personality and his legal philosophical approach representing the influence of Anglo- 
Saxon jurisprudence and legal culture gave rise to Szabó’s enthusiasm. It was the 
period in the Hungárián legal philosophical thinking when, besides the achievements 
of Austrian, Germán and French legal philosophy, those of English and American 
jurisprudence were alsó considered.
10 Horváth's works from the 50s and 60s: ‘Between Legal Realism and Idealism', in Northwestern 
University Law Review, 48 (1954) 639-713; ‘Ftights of Mán: Due Process of Law and Exces de 
Pouvoir', in: The American Journal of Comparative Law, 4 (1955) 539-573; ‘Field Law and Law 
Field', in Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 8 (1957) 44-81; ‘Morál, Recht und 
Politik', in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 14 (1963) 218-252; ‘Comparative 
Conflicts Law and the Conceptof Changing Law', in The American Journal of Comparative Law, 15 
(1966-67) 136-158; ‘Twilight of Government of Laws', in Archív für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 
64 (1968) 1-26.
11 Szabó's main works of jurisprudence: A jog alapjai [The foundations of law], Budapest, 
1938; A jogászi gondolkodás bölcseleté [Philosophy of lawyer's thinking], Szeged, 1941; ‘Hol 
az igazság? A bírói lélektan problémái' [Where is the justice? Problems of judge's psychology], 
in Társadalomtudomány, 22, 1942, 1, 1-55; ‘Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol im Rechte', in Archív für 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 37, 1943, 101-121; ‘Dér Rechtsbegriff in einer neutralistischen 
Beleuchtung', in Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffenliches Recht, 1, 1948, 3, 291-331.
73
Kontroll
As a result of Barna Horváth’s aim to establish a school, the ‘school of Szeged’ 
was founded, and it included, besides Szabó, István Bibó, who later abandoned legal 
philosophy, and alsó Tibor Vas, who became Marxist in the 1950s and renounced 
the mentality of the school. Szabó’s legal philosophical thinking bears the strongest 
marks of the master’s irradiant influence. He began to elaborate his independent legal 
philosophical doctrine in the laté 1930s. He was alsó deeply involved in issues on 
constitutional and International laws.
In his writings on legal philosophy Szabó attempts to discredit the Neo-Kantian 
model by using the outcomes of criticism, according to Dávid Hume, and the 
American legal realism. Szabó, in his works published in the early 1940s, attempted to 
create a ‘neo-realistic’ approach to the concept of law. Applying the method common 
in Anglo-Saxon professional literature, he modelled the essence of legal thinking 
with describing legal cases. With this kind of approach, he seemed to discover a 
number of similar features between English and Hungárián ‘traditional’ legal attitudes. 
Citing the ideas of Jerome Frank, Edward Robinson and Thurman Arnold, the most 
outstanding personalities of American legal realism, Szabó abandoned belief in legal 
security, which was, in his opinion, revived by a faulty logical philosophy of law. In 
his theory he alsó used Frank’s doctrine of ‘fact-sceptics’ and ‘rule-sceptics’. Szabó 
claimed that in law enforcement it is nőt merely the legal norms one is to consider 
when looking fór justice, since the statement of facts is as important a precondition 
fór a righteous judgement as the interpretation of the corresponding law. He believed 
that legal decisions are influenced by ‘psychological circumstances’.
When reading Szabó’s works, one can clearly perceive the ideas of American 
legal realism. At that time, in the early 1940s, this kind of theory was considered rather 
exceptional in the Hungárián literature of legal philosophy. The influence exerted by 
the classical representatives of legal realism is undeniable. When appreciating Szabó’s 
work one can suggest that, in a similar way to the evaluation of Horváth’s work, he 
alsó gave particular pragmatic explanations to the classical Neo-Kantian problems. 
Doing so, he created the possibility fór a prolific interrelation of two legal cultures, and 
abolished the previous one-sided Austrian and Germán orientation in the Hungárián 
legal philosophical thinking. This is considered very important even if we sometimes 
come across rather eclectic explanations. Neither the master nor his student is 
an exception to this. Regretfully, however, Szabó was nőt able to work out further 
systematic explanations to his theory of legal philosophy called ‘neo-realistic’.
During the after-war years he was involved in reorganising the legal faculty of the 
university in Szeged. After the ‘decisive year’ (1949) like the reputation of many of 
his contemporaries, his reputation was alsó ruined. After his long imprisonment, with 
a short interruption after the revolution in 1956, Szabó lived in intellectual exile fór a 
number of decades. Somé of his papers and reviews were published only abroad. 
Only the last years of his life, after his restitution, brought him the opportunity to be 
involved in the professional public life of the country fór a brief period.
A key precondition fór us fór being included in the European scientific life again 
is to know our traditions in legal philosophy and to apply all the research finds 
that our predeccessors have accumulated. However, we alsó have to be careful 
about fragmented oeuvres and they are to be compared to the scientific level of the 
concerned period. If we realise that there is a lack of original ideas and the theories
74
József Szabadfalvi: The Elem ents of Sociological Aspect...
only belong to the second line, we have to express this. On the other hand, however, 
we should be proud of what is valuable even today.
Finally, we must clarify that, from the end of the last century, Hungárián legal 
philosophical thinking have supported the bourgeois transformation and the 
establishment of a modern civil society, according to the demand fór modernisation of 
the society. Ágost Pulszky, Gyula Pikler, Bódog Somló, Barna Horváth, József Szabó 
and their students have become fighting representatives of Hungárián progress 
and they visioned a modern 20th-century Hungary. In this ambition a great role can 
be attributed to the ‘empirical State’, which is the driving force of modernisation, 
to the realisation of what kind of development can satisfy the needs of society, to 
‘correct law’ required fór achieving the goals, to the investigation of the natúré of law 
supporting the régimé, and alsó to the comparison of empirical reality and the related 
norms, and to everything that can provide the widest scope of freedom in the Kantian 
view. This üst could be continued bút even so we might perceive what kind of ambition 
our predeccessors had taken upon themselves. Although they could nőt provide a 
safe recipe bút they have established the starting-points fór us, since even today we 
often face the same problems and we do nőt have divergent goals, though we tend 
to achieve them by drawing on different paradigms.
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